On August 3, 2026, Jacinta Ngobese- Zuma, the founder of the controversial anti- immigration movement March and March, held a press briefing that sent ripples across South African media and political circles.
In a video shared by the South African
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC News) on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter), Ngobese-Zuma made a bold and highly contested claim: that crime in the country declined since the coordinated protests on June 30, 2026, against undocumented migrants.
This press briefing comes at a critical juncture for the nation. The events of June 30, and the subsequent weeks of unrest, have sparked a humanitarian crisis, strained diplomatic relations across the continent, and forced the South African Govt to implement the sweeping immigration enforcement measures.
As the nation approaches the November local elections, the debate over immigration, crime, and economic survival has never been more polarized.
The June 30 Deadline and the Rise of March and March
The current wave of anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa, while rooted in decades of xenophobia, has found a new and highly organized voice in the March and March movement.
Founded in 2025 by former radio presenter Jacinta Ngobese-Zuma, the group describes itself as a civic organization fighting for the prioritization of South African citizens.
March and March rose to national prominence following incidents of vigilante justice and the blockage of migrants from accessing public services like healthcare and schools.
The movement gained massive momentum in the spring of 2026, culminating in a nationwide call for an anti-migrant shutdown on May 4 and the establishment of a June 30 “deadline”
for undocumented foreigners to leave the country.
On that deadline day, approximately 120 marches were held across major cities, including Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, and Cape Town.
While many demonstrations remained
peaceful, others devolved into violence, leading to over 900 arrests nationwide.
Protesters, some armed with sticks and makeshift weapons, went door-to-door in townships like Alexandra and Soweto, searching for undocumented immigrants and forcing them out of their homes.
The Humanitarian and Diplomatic Fallout
The June 30 deadline and the subsequent weeks of protests have resulted in a massive exodus of foreign nationals from South Africa.
According to a tally by Agence France-Presse (AFP), more than 160,000 people from neighboring countries left the nation in June and July alone.
The South African government, under President Cyril Ramaphosa, responded by stepping up deportation efforts.
By mid-July, authorities announced that more than 53,000 foreign nationals had been deported or repatriated as part of a new “migration management” campaign.
The humanitarian toll has been severe. In late May, violence erupted in the Western Cape town of Mossel Bay, resulting in the destruction of dozens of informal settlements and the deaths of several Mozambican citizens.
Across the country, thousands of terrified migrants sought refuge in their respective embassies and consulates, overwhelming the facilities of countries like Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria.
The diplomatic fallout has been equally significant. South Africa’s historic allies have reacted with fury.
Nigeria and Ghana have initiated repatriations for their citizens, and Nigeria is reportedly planning to seek reparations for damages and harm inflicted on its nationals.
Ghana has called on the African Union to address the issue at an upcoming
summit, framing the violence as a crisis of continental proportions.
Fact-Checking the Claims of the Press Briefing
During the August 3 press briefing, Ngobese-Zuma confidently asserted that crime has dropped since the protests began, attributing the previous surge in criminality to the presence of undocumented migrants.
She also noted that while many have left, some Somali, Pakistani, Ethiopian, and Nigerian nationals are refusing to depart.
However, this central claim—that the anti-migrant crackdown has reduced crime— fiercely disputed by researchers, human rights organizations, and independent factcheckers.
According to a recent analysis by Africa Check, which reviewed official police statistics provided to The New York Times, foreign nationals make up approximately 5 percent of South Africa’s population but accounted for just 3 percent of arrests over the past five years.
Even more striking, they were responsible for only 1.2 percent of arrests for violent crime.
Critics of the March and March movement have pointed out that crime statistics are not released frequently enough to accurately measure short- term fluctuations.
A prominent political economist on X dismissed Ngobese-Zuma’s assertion as baseless, stating, “There are no official crime statistics being released quickly enough to make that assessment”.
Furthermore, experts argue that blaming immigrants for South Africa’s systemic issues is a dangerous deflection. The country’s economy is struggling with an unemployment rate hovering around 32 percent, and public frustration is high.
By scapegoating migrants, movements like March and March are providing a convenient target for citizens’ anxieties,
while ignoring the structural failures of the government and the local economy.
The Political Landscape and the Madlanga Commission
The resurgence of anti-immigrant sentiment is deeply intertwined with South Africa’s current political climate.
The ruling African National Congress (ANC) is experiencing its lowest level of popularity in its history, creating a fertile environment for populist and antiforeigner rhetoric.
Several opposition parties, including ActionSA, the Inkatha Freedom Party, and the newly formed uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) party led by former president Jacob Zuma, have either supported the marches or adopted similar hardline stances on immigration.
Political analysts warn that the upcoming local elections, scheduled for November 2026, may see these issues exploited further to secure votes.
Amidst this turmoil, the government has initiated the Madlanga Commission of Inquiry to investigate the root causes of the unrest and the efficacy of the state’s response.
The commission, which has been hearing testimonies from government officials, security experts, and affected citizens, was recently granted extension by President Ramaphosa to ensure a thorough investigation, with a final report due in November 2026.
In response to the escalating crisis, the South African government is calling for an Africawide migration summit to address the root causes of migration and the rising xenophobia across the continent.
The African Union has signaled its support for a broad debate on
the issue, emphasizing the need to look at both the “push” and “pull” factors of migration.
Conclusion
The press briefing by Jacinta Ngobese- Zuma on August 3, 2026, serves as a stark reminder of the deep-seated fractures within South African society.
While March and March has
successfully mobilized tens of thousands of citizens under the banner of “Africans First,” the movement’s actions have triggered a complex web of humanitarian, diplomatic, and economic crises.
As the weekly protests continue and the November elections approach, the nation stands at a crossroads.
The challenge for South Africa is not just to manage its borders, but to.address the profound inequalities and economic despair that fuel xenophobic sentiment, without sacrificing its historical commitment to pan-African solidarity.
