The World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General, Dr Tedros Ghebreyesus has officially declared the outbreak of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC).
This declaration, made under the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), signifies a serious public health risk requiring a coordinated international response, though it does not yet meet the criteria for a pandemic emergency.
The decision follows a thorough consultation with the affected States Parties and comprehensive assessment of the risk to human health, the potential for international spread, and the likelihood of interference with international traffic.
WHO DG commended the leadership of DRC and Uganda for their transparency and vigorous actions in managing the outbreak.
The Alarming Spread of Bundibugyo Virus Disease
As of May 16, 2026, the outbreak has seen a concerning rise in cases. In Ituri Province, DRC, 8 laboratory- confirmed cases, 246 suspected cases, and 80 suspected deaths have been reported across at least three health zones: Bunia, Rwampara, and Mongbwalu.
More critically, the virus has already crossed international borders, with 2 laboratory confirmed cases (including one death) reported in Kampala, Uganda, on May 15 and 16. These individuals had recently traveled from the DRC. 
Additionally, a confirmed case was
reported in Kinshasa, DRC, involving someone returning from Ituri. Unusual clusters of community deaths with the symptoms consistent with BVD have been observed in Ituri, and suspected cases are emerging in North Kivu.
A particularly worrying development is the report of at least four deaths among healthcare workers, suggesting potential healthcare-associated transmission and gaps in infection prevention and control
(IPC) measures.
This raises fears of amplification within health facilities, a critical concern given the high transmissibility of Ebola viruses.
Why This Outbreak is Extraordinary
The WHO’s declaration of a PHEIC is based on three key criteria: Extraordinary Event: The current outbreak is deemed extraordinary due to several factors.
Despite limited understanding of epidemiological links and true number of infected persons, a high positivity rate in initial samples, confirmed cases in major cities, like Kampala and Kinshasa, and increasing trends in syndromic reporting suggest a potentially much larger outbreak.
Compounding the risk are ongoing insecurity, a humanitarian crisis, high population mobility, the urban nature of the current hotspot, and a large network of informal healthcare facilities. Unlike other Ebola strains, there are currently no approved Bundibugyo virus-specific therapeutics or vaccines.
International Spread: The documented international spread to Uganda underscores the urgency of the situation. Neighboring countries sharing land borders with the DRC are considered at high risk due to significant population mobility, trade, and travel linkages.
Need for International Coordination: The complexity and potential for widespread
impact necessitate international coordination and cooperation. This is crucial for understanding the outbreak’s extent, harmonizing surveillance, prevention, and response efforts, and ensuring the capacity to implement effective control measures globally.
WHO’s Urgent Recommendations
In response to the escalating crisis, the WHO issued series of recommendations for affected and at-risk States Parties:
For States Parties where event is occurring (DRC, Uganda): Coordination: Activate national disaster/emergency management mechanisms and establish emergency operation centers to coordinate a comprehensive response, including enhanced surveillance, contact tracing, IPC, risk communication, laboratory testing, and case management.Community Engagement: Implement large-scale, sustained efforts to engage
communities through local leaders, addressing cultural norms that may hinder response efforts.
Surveillance & Laboratory: Strengthen surveillance and laboratory capacity, focusing on community deaths and decentralized testing.
Infection Prevention and Control: Enhance measures to prevent nosocomial infections in health facilities, ensuring adequate training and equipment for healthcare workers.Patient Care: Establish safe referral pathways and specialized treatment centers for isolation and intensive supportive care.
Research & Development: Implement clinical trials for candidate therapeutics and vaccines.
Border Health & Travel: Undertake cross-border screening and screening at main internal roads. Prohibit int’l travel for confirmed cases and contacts, unless for any medical evacuation. Implement exit screening for febrile illness at international points of entry. Consider postponing mass gatherings.
Safe Burials: Ensure safe and dignified burials conducted by trained personnel,
respecting cultural practices while minimizing infection risk.
Logistics: Establish a strong supply pipeline for medical commodities and personal protective equipment (PPE).For States Parties with land borders adjoining affected areas: Urgently enhance preparedness and readiness, including active surveillance, community for unexplained deaths, access to qualified diagnostic laboratories, and trained rapid response teams.
• Establish dedicated coordination mechanisms at national and subnational levels. Treat newly detected suspected or confirmed cases as a health emergency, taking immediate steps for investigation, isolation, case management, and contact tracing.
Increase risk communications and community engagement at points of entry. Prioritize approvals for investigational therapeutics.For all Other States Parties: Avoid Restrictions: Crucially, no country should close its borders or place restrictions
on travel and trade.
Such measures are scientifically unfounded and can exacerbate the crisis by driving movement to unmonitored informal crossings and negatively impacting local economies and response efforts.
Information Sharing: Work with airlines and tourism industries to align with WHO
advice on international traffic. Traveler Information: Provide travelers to affected areas with relevant risk information
and advice.Public Awareness: Inform the general public about BVD and risk reduction measures. Evacuation Preparedness: Be prepared to facilitate the evacuation and repatriation of nationals exposed to BVD.
Entry Screening: Entry screening at airports outside the affected region is not considered necessary for returning passengers.
The WHO further said it will convene an Emergency Committee to further advise on temporary recommendations to manage this critical public health threat.
